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## BOOK REVIEWS

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**Istvan Kecskes: Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2** (Studies on language acquisition, vol. 19). Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2003, x + 228 pp.

The book under review is about highly conventionalized, prefabricated pragmatic units whose occurrences are tied to standardized communicative situations, e.g., responses like *Not at all*, *You are welcome* or *You bet* to *Thank you*. These formulaic expressions are called situation-bound utterances (SBUs) by the author (p. 4), who prefers this term to other labels used in regard to similar phenomena (e.g., *interaction rituals*, *routine formulae*, *situational utterances*, *bound utterances* or *institutionalized expressions*). Istvan Kecskes discusses several important issues related not only to this particular group of pragmatic units but also to lexical units in general. They include such timeless problems as the relationship between linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge, the interplay of lexical units and context, the distinction between literal and figurative meaning and the role of creativity and formulaicity, as well as recently raised ideas about salience or conceptual socialization. This complexity of issues presupposes **an interdisciplinary perspective**. In fact, reading the book we encounter results and hypotheses from several fields: theoretical linguistics, applied linguistics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and second language acquisition. However, they all find their place in Kecskes's **cognitive-pragmatic framework** whose two key properties are “that 1) language research is bound to be concerned with the linguistic and conceptual dimensions at the same time, and that 2) language is a dynamic entity” (pp. 8–9). Another main characteristic feature of the approach applied in this book is its **multi-lingual (even multicultural) perspective**. It is the analysis of the problems non-native speakers have during acquisition and use of SBUs that enables us to look into the interconnections of linguistic and socio-cultural factors in the use of these pragmatic units. Thus, the endeavour carried out by the author yields, besides the analyses of (American) English, Hungarian, Russian, French, German, Turkish, Arabic, Chinese and Japanese SBUs, such a theoretical building the base of which is the Dynamic Meaning Model (DMM) in combination with the Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH). DMM and GSH serve as components explaining contextual mechanisms of shaping meaning and interpretation in the dual language system, which is in turn responsible for conceptual socialization.

In chapter 2 Kecskes offers the DMM as an alternative to prototype theory, Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic Metalanguage conception and Bierwisch's two-level conceptual semantics. As we learn, the DMM describes the meaning of a lexical unit, either a word or an SBU, in terms of coresense, consense, culture-specific conceptual properties and word-specific semantic properties (extending the model to SBUs, Kecskes calls the latter ones formula-specific pragmatic properties). Let us see them in some detail taking into consideration here the word from the set of lexical units. Coresense is an abstraction from possible contextual occurrences of the word, while a contextual meaning of the word, consense, realizes a particular aspect or aspects of

the coresense. To put it the other way around, not all core components are present all the time. If so, it hardly seems to be true that “[c]oresense is the invariant while consense represents the possible variants” (p. 43). Below I will return to problems of coresense. As to culture-specific conceptual properties, encoded in the word, they can be either activated or cancelled by the context. Furthermore, word-specific semantic properties are either encoded in the word or charged by the context. Thus, the DMM can be characterized as expressing the two-way relationship between concept and word and as grasping the dynamic interaction between meaning and context.

Chapter 3 presents further details about the role of context in interpretation. The dynamism of relation between lexical unit and context is a two-way relationship as well: contexts not only specify meanings of lexical units, but are also created by lexical units. For instance, the SBU *Bless you* has the built-in context of someone’s sneezing. If this context does not match the actual context because someone coughs but does not sneeze, the SBU cannot be uttered appropriately. It is here that salience comes into play. The most conventional, frequent, familiar or prototypical interpretation is the most salient meaning of a given lexical unit. Primary consense appears to be the most salient meaning, which can be either literal or figurative. Before turning to the connection between salience and modes of interpretation, two remarks by Kecskes have to be mentioned. First, salience can be a matter of lexical and not necessarily of conceptual representation, which also supports the legitimacy of differentiating lexical semantics from conceptual semantics. Second, the literal–figurative dichotomy makes sense for language analysis but not for language processing.

According to the Graded Salience Hypothesis of Giora (1997), different linguistic expressions call for different interpretation processes. Direct processing applies when the most salient meaning is intended. It is accessed directly, without processing the less salient (even if literal) meaning. In the case of sequential processing, the more salient meaning is processed first, before the intended one is derived. Parallel processing is induced when more than one meaning is salient. In this case all the equally salient meanings are accessed initially. Consequently, context affects comprehension after the highly salient meaning has been accessed or equally salient meanings have been activated. If the former is compatible with the context, no further effort is needed. However, if it is not, a possible alternative is looked for. As for equally salient meanings, one of them should be selected on the basis of context.

At this point of my review I have to consider the notion of coresense once again. On p. 45 the author modifies what he means by core meaning. Let us recall that a consense may realize **some** aspects of coresense. According to the modified version, the most salient meaning of a particular lexical unit, e.g., ‘easy’ of the expression *piece of cake*, is described as coresense. That is, a full-fledged meaning is equated **entirely** with coresense. In addition, the literal meaning of *kick* and its Hungarian equivalent *rúg* (‘to strike out with the foot or feet’) is indicated as equivalent coresense in example (17) on p. 50. Here—in connection with examples (18) and (19)—it is also claimed that “contextual use shows that the almost equivalent coresenses are added WSPs [word-specific semantic properties] and CSCP[s] [culture-specific conceptual properties] which are very different in the two languages”. Thus, there are **a couple of notions of coresense** which are not identical. Unfortunately, they are not kept systematically apart throughout the book.

Investigating SBUs, Kecskes regards not only native speakers but also non-native speakers. This investigation rests on the notions of dual language system (DLS) and Common Underlying Conceptual Base (CUCB) known from his previous work and

introduced briefly on pp. 10–1. Depending on several factors (e.g., proficiency, exposure to language and culture, motivation, age), bilinguals can have a unique competence referred to as the DLS in which neither of the participating languages can be compared to a monolingual system. In order for a DLS to develop, the conceptual structure is to change from an L1-dominated conceptual base into a CUCB which is responsible for the operation of both languages. The development of the CUCB goes together with what Kecskes calls conceptual socialization. Chapter 8 is devoted to this concept entirely. “Conceptual socialization refers to the transformation of conceptual system which undergoes characteristic changes to fit the functional needs of the new language and culture” (p. 157). This yields the gradual development of awareness of cultural differences and the emergence of a dynamic social identity which reflects dual culture. During the process of conceptual socialization L2 learners should be familiarized with the communication patterns of the target language which are dependent on the culture and the structural organization of language. From the literature on parameters of differences between cultures, Kecskes mentions those frames which have some special bearing on the use of SBUs in different cultures. Cultures can be classified in terms of high and low context, directness and indirectness, doing and being, linearity and non-linearity of thought. The first difference, i.e., that of high-context and low-context cultures depends on how much meaning is encoded in the context and in the linguistic code. In the case of the second one, direct style of communication requires clarity, explicitness and accurate representation of facts. In contrast, indirectness is more ambiguous and emotionally rich. The third parameter concerns emphasis put either on activities which result in accomplishments, or on what the communicator is (the individual’s birth, family background, age, rank). Finally, the linear cultural pattern highlights beginnings and ends of events, is object-oriented while the message structure of non-linear cultures has multiple themes, for it people and events are more important than time orientation. (American) English or German culture can be described as low-context, direct, doing and linear while cultures like Turkish and Arabic are high-context, indirect, being and non-linear. Cultures such as French, Swedish or Dutch are closer to the former group, Japanese or Russian to the latter. What relation does this classification have to SBUs? Let us take the first distinction as an example. In low-context cultures, the speaker is supposed to convey the meaning accurately and thoroughly. According to this idea, low-context cultures like American would require the use of less SBUs than high-context cultures. As Kecskes cautions, however, we must be careful here. There are two types of SBUs according to their content: situation-bound rituals and situation-bound routines. It is only the former that are not characteristic of American culture. It seems to prefer routines to rituals while in high-context cultures it is the other way around.

Since these two main groups of SBUs are introduced in chapter 5, which is about the distinguishing features of SBUs, let us turn to a presentation of SBUs in detail. SBUs can be considered as **pragmatic idioms that take a special place among idioms** because they have some features along which they differ from other idiomatic expressions. First, SBUs create their own context, i.e., are strongly tied to standard situations and are not used outside their usual context. Second, when idioms are used it is rare that the whole sentence is idiomatic. In contrast, SBUs usually form one single unit which functions as an utterance and no change is possible within the unit. Third, if SBUs derive from freely generated expressions (another possible way of their originating is from other types of fixed expressions), they may often keep their original composi-

tional meaning. In certain cases expressions such as *Give me a hand, I'll talk to you later, Don't go away* can be processed both in a compositional and non-compositional way. In other words, they can have more than one salient meaning. However, this is usually not the case with idioms where the relation between compositional meaning and functional meaning is almost lost (for instance: *wet blanket, spill the beans, touch base with, go Dutch, get down to the wire*). Fourth, because of the above possibility of different consenses, SBUs are more context-sensitive than other idioms.

As mentioned already, Kecskes distinguishes between situation-bound rituals (e.g., *God bless you*) and situation-bound routines (e.g., *How are you doing?, Nice to meet you, Welcome aboard*). This distinction has to do with whether SBUs directly say something about the action and/or participants or relate them to other situations or agents. The situation-bound rituals are especially frequent in tradition-oriented Turkish, Arabic, Japanese and Chinese cultures. Their use is almost obligatory and no freely-generated phrases are appropriate instead. The situations which require the use of SBUs in tradition-oriented cultures may not be even recognized by native speakers of English as events demanding any verbal reaction.

In chapter 6 an analysis of the results of three tests conducted by Kecskes demonstrates the differences between native and non-native speakers **in the interpretation of (American) English SBUs**. In Test 1 students were asked to describe the meaning of SBUs without context. Both the native speakers' and non-native speakers' responses support the Graded Salience Hypothesis. The majority of students found the most salient meaning. Where parallel processing was present because two meanings were equally salient (e.g., *Get out of here, Give me a break*), native speakers were divided in their decision since there were no contexts which could help in shaping meaning. However, non-native speakers (who had studied English in their home country and had been in the USA for at least six months) preferred literal meaning to figurative meaning, which supported the author's hypothesis about non-native speakers' language processing which usually prioritizes literal meaning. In Test 2 students were given dialogues with SBUs most of which have both a literal and a figurative meaning as salient. Context was biased for the figurative meaning and the experimentees had to recognize that meaning in the given situation. There was no difference in how native speakers processed SBUs in context. When parallel processing had to be applied because both literal and figurative meanings were salient, context played a crucial role. This was not necessarily the case for non-native speakers and contextual cues did not always help them to find the correct salient meaning if the salient meaning was not the literal one. Finally, Test 3 consisted of SBUs which usually have the figurative meaning as the most salient. This test used them in their less salient meaning which was their original literal one. Responses of native speakers demonstrated that the less salient meaning was processed sequentially with no problem if the context was clear. In a few cases, however, where the situation was unclear, some native speakers and many non-native speakers directly processed the most salient meaning.

On the basis of a thorough analysis of the test results Kecskes rightly states that language processing is difficult for non-native speakers because "they do not have direct access to the most accessible (for the native speakers) information in the target language since it is not stored or coded in their L1-dominated mental lexicon. What is stored and encoded there is what is salient in the native tongue and culture of language learners, and that usually does not work in the target language" (p. 133). Moreover, what can be salient in the L2 for a non-native speaker is the literal meaning

of the target language expression. That is why non-native speakers did not have any difficulty identifying the compositional meaning of SBUs but problems occurred when literal meaning was not the most salient meaning.

In chapter 9 Kecskes gives an account of investigating **the use of SBUs by non-native speakers of English** (who—as with the above tests—had studied English in their home country and had been in the USA for at least six months). Subjects, among which there were also native speakers of English, were given three types of test: a Dialogue Interpretation Test, two Discourse Completion Tests and a Problem Solving Test. The Dialogue Interpretation Test aimed at determining the extent to which the interpretation of American English SBUs by non-native speakers was the same as that by native speakers. Like Test 2 above, items of this test contained a dialogue with an SBU that students were to interpret. In the first Discourse Completion Test participants had to give a response to questions such as: *Can I talk to you after class?* or *How was the party last night?* In the second Discourse Completion Test students were expected to supply the missing part of a short dialogue. For instance:

- Hi, John. How is it going?
- .....
- Listen, can I talk to you after class?
- .....
- OK, see you after class.
- .....

The Problem Solving Test described a frequent situation in which an utterance should be made. This test needed more culture-specific knowledge than Discourse Completion Tests. For example: “You want to talk to your professor. You knock at his door, open it, and say what?”

Like the general conclusion of the three **interpretation** tests above, one of the main findings of testing **the use** of SBUs by non-native speakers is that they had difficulties with respect to language-specific principles of salience in the target language and their conceptual socialization had not been completed yet. This was especially true in cases where parallel processing emerged and non-native speakers had to decide whether the more salient meaning of an SBU was figurative or literal in the given situation.

The use of SBUs demonstrated three developmental stages: (1) the period of strong L1-culture transfer, (2) false generalizations and (3) when things fall into place. The analysis of the results revealed that length of stay in the USA was less important than distance of cultures and familiarity with English discourse patterns.

As the last theoretical question to be discussed in the present review, I want to mention the topic of chapter 7, namely the dichotomy of creativity and formulaicity. Kecskes states that—in comparison with generating a sentence—to construct a text or conversation needs a more complex type of creativity which has, on the one hand, grammatical and, on the other, logical and socio-cultural aspects. However, we do not only use our ability to create novel strings but also recall the prefabricated units that were stored in our mind from previous encounters with those units. Elsewhere in linguistic literature the question of what is stored and what is computed online is seriously taken as well. Thus, Jackendoff (2002) proposes such a major reorganization of the theory of grammar which sets his framework apart from mainstream generative

linguistics bearing on, among others, connections between a theory of competence and a theory of performance. From those changes, here I want to pay attention only to a small segment. This is the recognition that lexical items include not just words but also productive morphological affixes and idioms. Idioms themselves are unanalysed wholes with regard to their semantics. Nevertheless, from a phonological and syntactic point of view they consist of separable words, so constituting phrasal (syntactic) categories rather than lexical ones. As to language acquisition, what is interesting now is not issues of Universal Grammar but of extracting patterns from stored items through generalization. Kecskes also notices the large-scale use of ready-made chunks or prefabricated units **during L1 acquisition**. However, it turns out that they are meant very broadly because they include such an NP as *cup of tea*. The fact that it is initially learned as one unit is evidenced by the pluralized form *cup of teas*. Discussing the role of formulaic sequences (including SBUs) **in L2 acquisition**, Kecskes takes into consideration the following factors: (a) difference between the L2 and L1 acquisition process, (b) differences between naturalistic and classroom environment, (c) differences between child and adult L2 learning, (d) differences in individual learners and e) difference in the role of formulae. What is common in all studies is that they focus mainly on the structural features of memorized chunks and their role in the acquisition of syntax. Adult L2 learners often assume that an element in an expression may be varied according to a phrase structure rule, when in fact no variation or some very restricted one is allowed in native-like usage. Kecskes, however, emphasizes that this assumption of L2 learners depends on the type of fixed expressions, i.e., prefabricated chunks vs. SBUs. The former can support the development of syntactic rules by the learner breaking them down into their constituents. This can occur because these memorized chunks have a compositional structure and most of them are semantically transparent (e.g., *What is this?*, *Can I have...?*, *I wanna...*, *There is no...*). However, this is not the case with the latter, i.e., SBUs that are pragmatic rather than syntactic units. If broken down into constituents, they could do more harm than good to L2 learners because their functional meaning can hardly be figured out from the elements they contain. Consequently, SBUs cannot be expected to take part in the development of grammatical competence in L2.

As to typographical layout, some details should have been amended before publishing this book. There are redundant spaces between words and redundant hyphens between syllables. The use of quotation marks of different form ("..." vs. "...") is unjustified and references to linguistic literature from which quotations are taken are in the wrong place, i.e., before the closing quotation mark. Typos also occur: e.g., *dischronically* (p. 19), *it is use in a context* (p. 37), *coresense units the two levels* (p. 43), *it units the lexical and conceptual level* (p. 48), *human cognition trends to be geared* (pp. 66, 79), *In a attempt* (p. 123), *pervious experience* (p. 180), *c.f.* (many times throughout the book). Some editorial effort could have co-ordinated references to linguistic literature in the main text and the list of references. Some of the former cannot be found in the latter (e.g., Kiefer 1997 — p. 5, Nuyts 2001 — p. 8, Vygotsky 1962 — p. 34, Cook 1997, Rosch 1977 — both on p. 36, Chomsky 1997 — p. 55, Katz et al. 1998 — p. 68, Mey 1993 — p. 109).

To conclude, Kecskes's book stimulates discussions on several general theoretical topics such as e.g., modelling the meaning of various lexical items including SBUs, the interaction between meaning and context, the reflection of the language and culture interplay in the process of conceptual socialization, issues of salience in interpretation

as well as problems of acquisition of SBUs by L2 learners. Despite the criticism contained in the present review, *Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2* is well worth reading because it is a volume **provoking further discussion and highlighting those areas where further research** is needed.

Károly Bibok

## References

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**Enikő Németh T. and Károly Bibok (eds): *Pragmatics and the flexibility of word meaning*** (Current research in the semantics/pragmatics interface, vol. 8). Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2001, xii + 330 pp.

This multidisciplinary book brings together the current research of scholars with a variety of backgrounds but a common focus, the interaction between lexical semantics and pragmatics. The thirteen authors examine a range of specific linguistic phenomena and theories and use a variety of frameworks, methodological approaches and languages in developing their arguments. There are, however, certain theories that appear consistently throughout the book (i.e., conversational implicature, relevance theory, optimality theory and Bierwisch's two-level conceptual semantic approach). There is also a common theme: that research in semantics and research in pragmatics complement each other and each may offer valuable insights that could enrich research in the other.

**Introduction** by Enikő Németh T. and Károly Bibok

The editors briefly discuss the emergence of lexical pragmatics as a new linguistic discipline which connects lexical semantics and pragmatics. They point out that the papers in the book have a common aim of exploring this interaction, but each examines different phenomena and uses a variety of methods and frameworks. This is followed by a concise summary of each article.

**Two case studies in lexical pragmatics** by Reinhard Blutner and Torgrim Solstad

In this paper, Blutner and Solstad point out that the situated meanings of many words are combinations of their lexical meanings and superimposed conversational implicature. They propose a bidirectional version of optimality theory which integrates expressive and interpretive optimization as a framework for investigating the interactions between the (mental) lexicon and pragmatics. They use this framework to account for the effects of negative strengthening in connection with gradable adjectives, typically antonyms such as *happy* – *unhappy*, *good* – *bad*, and to resolve the puzzles of dimensional designation of spatial adjectives such as *long*, *high*, *broad*, *deep* and *thick*. Throughout the article the authors use examples to support and/or justify their claims. Graphs and model diagrams have been created to make optimal pairs and spatial objects look more visual to readers and enable them to understand and find

connections between old versions of OT and newly created versions of OT by the authors. However, they neglect to do this when they explain Jäger's variant (2000) of the weak version of bidirectional OT (pp. 15–6), which is difficult to follow without proper illustrations. It is also not clear exactly why the authors consider the M-principle of Levinson (2000, 33) as an epiphenomenon that results from the interaction of the Q- and I-Principles.

**On the scales and implicatures of *even*** by Igor Boguslavsky

In his paper, Boguslavsky addresses some unusual phenomenon of the scales and implicatures of *even*, mostly in Russian. He presents rich data to discuss the opposition between two interpretations of *even* utterances *not X, not even Y but Z* labeled as “diminuendo” and “crescendo” sentences and their conflict with the scalar implicature of *even* in the traditional approach. He argues that the difference in their interpretation derives from different strategies used by the addressees. Some of Boguslavsky's examples are, however, rather confusing and fail to make the point. This is especially true for example (22) on page 37: “The poem was not published and not even written.” What the author probably wants to say is “The poem was not published and, in fact, was not even written.” But the problem, as far as it sounds logical, is with the word *written*. To say it was not even written makes it sound like it never existed.

The author concludes that scalar implicature “belongs exactly to the intersection of pragmatics and linguistic semantics” (p. 49) because on the one hand it must be interpreted in the context based on the literal meaning, the context of the utterance, and background knowledge, and on the other hand it is language-specific.

**The flexibility of inference in triggers for inferable entities: Evidence for an interpretability constraint** by Sharon A. Cote

Cote's paper discusses the complexity of inferable entities—entities not yet directly introduced into the discourse context but having a relevant relationship to some other activated entity. She uses data from a corpus study to examine various types of inferable entities and the “triggers”, referring expressions, used by speakers to lead hearers to make the intended inference in discourse, and argues that hearers determine reference according to an interpretability constraint: “[a] hearer must be able to assign as much meaning to a pronoun as is needed to avoid causing a speaker to fail to achieve his discourse purpose” (p. 68). Cote provides examples of ways in which this constraint can be satisfied.

**In defence of monosemy** by Thorstein Fretheim

Although Fretheim does not dispute the existence of lexical polysemy, he claims that often what would be taken as lexical polysemy should actually be considered monosemy with the meaning being modified by context-driven inferences. He relies on Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) Relevance Theory as a guiding theory, accepting their argument that most concepts do not map onto words, only a fraction of a language user's conceptual repertoire is lexicalized. There is no doubt about the correctness of this statement; however, it is a bit lopsided. Several researchers have argued that the concept–word relationship is a two-way street in which the word as a linguistic entity gains some independence and affects the concepts (e.g., Vygotsky 1962; Cruse 1992; Kecskes–Papp 2000). The reason for lexical polysemy should be sought in this unique relationship.



In his paper, Fretheim focuses discussion on four lexical entries of “function words”: *after all* and *at least* in English, *(al)likevel* and *med en gang / med det samme* in Norwegian, from a monosemy-based relevance theory perspective. He points out that these function words are used as blueprints to engage the hearer in a specific kind of inferential activity. In all four cases, Fretheim argues that they can be better defined not in terms of lexical polysemy but in terms of a single lexical definition that combines with substantial reliance on contextual enrichment in actual conversational dialogue.

**Pragmatics and the flexibility of theoretical terms in linguistics: Two case studies** by András Kertész

In this article, Kertész addresses what he sees as a three-part problem involving theoretical terms in linguistics: 1. What is the structure of theoretical terms in generative linguistics? 2. How does the structure of theoretical terms influence the structure of scientific explanations in generative linguistics? 3. To what extent are the answers to the first two questions related to semantic and pragmatic factors? Kertész adopts two theoretic frameworks: holism (cognitive theory of metaphor) and modularism (two-level approach) to exemplify the applicability of cognitive approaches to the investigation of concept formation in generative linguistics. Kertész demonstrates that the similarities and differences between the two solutions to the above three questions produce important generalizations concerning the applicability of cognitive approaches in the analysis of scientific concept formation.

**The development of the grounding predication: Epistemic modals and cognitive predicates** by Péter Pelyvás

In the paper Pelyvás addresses some factors that led to the emergence of the grounding predication (a device that relates sentences/utterances to the situation of their use, with special attention to the speaker’s epistemic commitment) by examining two areas: modal auxiliaries (a grammatical category) and cognitive/modal predicates (a lexical category). Pelyvás discusses the general tendencies in the development of the epistemic senses of the modals from their root meanings, analyzing the changes in the image schemas of the modals that mark the development. He pays special attention to changes within immediate scope responsible for the presence vs. absence of relations like permission or obligation, to the reference-point construction, and to subjectification, which is the critical step in the development of the grounding predication. Pelyvás demonstrates that the root and epistemic schemas developed from modals can be applied to modal predicates (e.g., *permit*, *allow*, *oblige*, *forbid*) as well as to cognitive predicates (e.g., *seem*, *appear*, *think*, *assume*). Although the author’s approach is logical and interesting, he relies mainly on Langacker’s (1999) and Sweetser’s (1990) studies and completely ignores other authors such as Bybee and Fleischman (1995), Papafragou (2000), and Nuyts (2000) who have made invaluable contribution to the understanding of epistemic modality.

**What is polysemy?—A survey of current research and results** by Gergely Pethő

Pethő begins his comprehensive overview of polysemy by pointing out that the main problem for polysemy research is that there has been poor communication between the various strands of research in this area. This has resulted in fragmentation of research and has hindered progress. Using Paul Deane’s (1987) dissertation on polysemy as a point of departure for a summary of the research done in polysemy from the early 1980’s to the present, he presents findings from researchers in various linguistic

fields. He concludes that, despite the apparent incoherence of their terminology and methods of description and the fragmentation of the research, the various approaches generally seem to complement rather than contradict each other and suggests that the approaches be considered “pieces of a puzzle” that all contribute to the understanding of polysemy. The author is right when he refers to the poor communication between the various strands in polysemy research. At the same time, however, he also contributes to the problem because his overview is rather fragmented and sometimes it is difficult to see what criteria Pethő used when he selected whose contribution he was going to discuss in his overview. His overview is done from a lexical semantics perspective rather than from a lexical pragmatics perspective.

**Interpreting morphologically complex lexemes revisited** by Tvrtko Prčić

Prčić emphasizes the complementary nature of semantics and pragmatics. Using English agentive nouns as examples, he examines in detail first the role of semantics and then the role of pragmatics in interpreting them. In his discussion of semantics, he focuses on morphosemantic compositionality, binary processing and semantic underspecification. He concludes that a decontextualized, semantics-only interpretation leaves the sense of the lexeme insufficiently specified and requires information to be filled in during pragmatic specialization. In his discussion of the role of pragmatics he addresses inferables, the transparency/opacity cline, explicit, implicit, and implied meaning, and pragmatic specialization. He concludes that “contextualized, pragmatics-enriched, interpretation of morphologically complex lexemes [...] results in a reading characterized by all information required for successful interpretation appropriately supplied” (p. 240).

**Cultural constraints on meaning extension: Derivational relations between actions and happenings** by Raissa Rozina

Rozina examines the pattern of semantic derivation that results in the development of general slang in Russian. She distinguishes general slang, which is spoken or at least understood by all adult speakers of standard Russian, from slang that is associated with a particular social or age group. She examines what it is about general slang words that enables educated speakers of Russian to distinguish the slang meaning from the standard word meaning even though the words generally do not differ semantically from standard Russian. She hypothesizes that this is based on regular patterns of semantic extension which are different for slang words and standard words. Her analysis focuses on the bidirectional patterns of meaning extension in Russian verbs. She concludes that the derivation of happenings from action verbs results in standard meanings, while the derivation of actions from happenings results in slang meanings. The examples the author uses to justify her claims are overwhelming and without some knowledge of Russian the reader may miss the point.

**The communicative function of the Hungarian adverbial marker *majd* ‘later on, some time’** by Ildikó Vaskó

In her paper, Vaskó addresses the Hungarian adverbial marker *majd* that can be paraphrased as ‘later on, some time’ from a pragmatic perspective within the framework of relevance theory. She uses ample examples from Hungarian to show that *majd* consists of these two characteristic features: a certain state of affairs will take place some time in the future, and for the successful realization of the events that *majd* is connected to, certain conditions have to be met. Vaskó argues that this adverb *majd*

encodes not only conceptual meaning (e.g., postpone of an event in the time flow) but also conveys procedural information (e.g., speakers' attitude) by instructing the hearer to constrain the temporal reference to a time in the future when interpreting the utterances with *majd*.

**How the lexicon and context interact in the meaning construction of utterances** by Károly Bibok and Enikő Németh T.

Bibok and Németh T. examine three types of Hungarian utterances: utterances with implicit arguments, utterances with implicit predicates, and utterances in which the predicate and argument are connected to each other by "co-composition". They begin with descriptions of each type of utterance and demonstrate through a systematic and unified analysis that the meaning construction of these types of utterances can only be described through "an intensive interaction between the lexicon and context" (p. 317). They apply Sperber and Wilson's (1995) cognitive principle of relevance to the three types of utterances and argue that it explains the possibility that an argument or predicate can be lexically unrealized. If arguments and predicates can be identified by 1. lexical conceptualization, 2. taking immediate context into consideration or 3. extending the context, then these arguments and predicates should be lexically unrealized according to the principle of relevance. The cognitive principle of relevance also explains the possibility of composing larger units from predicates and arguments by "co-composition".

#### Evaluation

This book examines the interaction between lexical semantics and pragmatics by combining insightful exploration of theories from a range of research perspectives in the field of linguistics. It makes the case for a new line in pragmatics research: lexical pragmatics. The diversity of topics explored and different methodologies and frameworks used result in a collection of articles with little connection beyond a similar format and a few theories that seem to be a common thread. However, the editors explain that this collection of articles is meant to stimulate further work in the new field of lexical pragmatics rather than attempt to present an integrated approach at this stage. This argument is completely acceptable although it would have made the volume more reader-friendly if those papers which have something in common had been placed one after the other in the book. First of all, we think of Fretheim and Pethő; Prčić and Bibok – Németh T.

The theoretical complexity of the book ranges from in-depth analysis of single lexical units (e.g., *even*, *after all*) to an examination of different views on a major theory: monosemy vs. polysemy. The majority of the articles assume a great deal of previous knowledge of linguistic theory, and some are quite complex and technical. However, examples in several languages (English, Russian, Hungarian, Norwegian) and diagrams in most articles make the complex theories more accessible to the reader. In spite of this, in some articles (e.g., Rozina, Vaskó) it is not easy to follow the arguments without any knowledge of the given languages.

This collection of papers will function as a source book for those who are interested in lexical semantics and lexical pragmatics. Not many of the readers, however, will read all articles. Those whose interest is in lexical semantics will be more satisfied than their counterparts who take up the book to learn more about lexical pragmatics. The fact of the matter is that there is little about pragmatics in any sense of the word in some of the articles (Fretheim, Kertész, Pelyvás, Pethő, Rozina). They are good and interesting studies on their own right in lexical semantics but do not have much

to do with lexical pragmatics as the discipline is presented in the introduction and the rest of the papers.

The literature referred to and reviewed in most papers is rich and comprehensive. It gives guidance to the readers in the relatively new field of lexical pragmatics. However, there is no mention about an important work that also discusses lexical pragmatics in relation to cognitive semantics: Fischer (2000).

In sum, the primary goal of this collection of papers is to inform readers about an emerging new field of research: lexical pragmatics. This goal is served well. Although the book is too advanced for use as a textbook in any but the most advanced linguistics class, it will serve as an excellent resource for students focusing on language-oriented research and for any linguists interested in lexical semantics and exploring the new linguistic discipline of lexical pragmatics.

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